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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—LANHAM ACT—CULPABLE CONDUCT 
OTHER THAN WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF A MARK IS SUFFICIENT TO 
CONSTITUTE AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) FOR 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES—SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2000). 
In 1980, Ronald Libengood founded SecuraComm Associates, a 
security systems consulting firm located in Pennsylvania.  
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 274-75 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Libengood incorporated his firm in 1992, renaming it 
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. (SecuraComm Pennsylvania).  Id. at 
275.  In 1993, Libengood applied for federal registration the service 
mark “Securacomm” for security consulting.  The mark was 
registered in 1997. 
Libengood became aware of a New Jersey firm in the nuclear 
security field called Burns & Roe Securacom in 1987.  Though the 
names were similar, Libengood took no action because of the 
differing clientele of the firms and the addition of the words “Burns 
& Roe” to the firm name was not likely to cause confusion. 
In 1992, however, the Burns & Roe Securacom firm adopted the 
name Securacom Incorporated (Securacom New Jersey) and 
expanded its business activities to include a wider range of security 
services.  When Libengood learned of Securacom New Jersey’s new 
name and expanded business in early 1993, he immediately sent 
them a cease-and-desist letter.  For the next two and one-half years, 
Libengood attempted to resolve the conflict with Securacom New 
Jersey.  Libengood ultimately offered to sell the SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania mark to Securacom New Jersey for  
$275,000.  After receiving no response to his offer, Libengood 
threatened to file suit against Securacomm New Jersey.  
Securacomm New Jersey’s chairman of the board, Wirt D. Walker, 
III, subsequently threatened Libengood with financial ruin if he filed 
suit. 
In the fall of 1995, Libengood filed suit under the Lanham Act 
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Id. 
at 275-76.  Securacom New Jersey answered with counterclaims 
identical to those pled by SecuraComm Pennsylvania, as well as a 
libel claim.  Id. at 276.  Shortly thereafter, Securacom New Jersey 
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also filed suit against Libengood and his attorney in New Jersey 
State Superior Court alleging various business-related torts and 
statutory violations.  Id.  Due to ethical obligations, Libengood’s 
attorney was forced  to withdraw as counsel in the Lanham Act suit 
because he was named in the subsequent suit with Libengood.  Id.  
Upon consolidation of the federal and state suits, the district court 
dismissed Securacom New Jersey’s state suit as meritless.  Id. 
In addition to these actions, Securacom New Jersey petitioned 
the Patent and Trademark Office for the cancellation of Securacomm 
Pennsylvania’s service mark, and filed suit in the District of 
Columbia Superior Court claiming service mark infringement by 
SecuraComm Pennsylvania.  Id.  Upon removal of that case to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the district 
court in New Jersey enjoined pursuit of the suit by Securacomm 
New Jersey in the District of Columbia pending the results of the 
original case.  Id. 
In the fall of 1997, a bench trial in the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey found that Libengood had proved conclusive 
service mark ownership and that Securacom New Jersey had 
willfully infringed on that mark.  Id.  The district court issued an 
injunction preventing Securacom New Jersey from using 
“Securacom” in the United States and Puerto Rico.  Id. at 276-77.  
The court awarded relief to SecuraComm Pennsylvania in the form 
of ten percent of Securacom New Jersey’s profits.  Id. at 277.  In 
addition, the court found that the egregious circumstances of this 
case warranted an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees.  Id. 
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the award of Securacomm 
New Jersey’s profits, as the court found that the record was 
inadequate to permit an inference of willful infringement.  Id.  
Because the finding of willful infringement was the primary factor 
in awarding attorney’s fees, the appellate court remanded for a 
determination of whether any other exceptional circumstances 
justified such relief.  Id.  Prior to the remand, Securacom New Jersey 
moved to have the district court judge recuse himself.  Id. 
On remand, the district court first denied the recusal motion.  
Id.  In addition, the District Court found exceptional circumstances 
and awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $233,600.26 pursuant 
to § 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  Id.  The court held 
that Securacomm New Jersey’s bad faith negotiations and use of 
oppressive litigation tactics satisfied the exceptional case 
requirement of the Lanham Act.  Id. 
Securacom New Jersey again appealed to the Third Circuit for 
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the denial of their recusal motion and the award of attorney’s fees.  
Id.  The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  Id. at 283. 
Judge Sloviter, writing for a unanimous appeals panel, first 
addressed the recusal motion.  Id. at 278.  The court observed that 
under the statutory standard, recusal is only appropriate when a 
reasonable person could question a judge’s impartiality.  Id.  
Further, the judge maintained that the justification for recusal rarely 
originates in the judicial proceedings, but rather is usually found in 
some extra-judicial source.  Id.  Continuing, Judge Sloviter observed 
that in the instant case, all the bases for recusal proffered by 
Securacom New Jersey were to be found in the judicial proceedings 
before the district court.  Id.  After a thorough review of the court 
record, the panel found that recusal was not warranted and affirmed 
the district court’s denial of the motion.  Id. 
The court, turning to the award of attorney’s fees, first observed 
that the Lanham Act permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party only in cases of exceptional circumstances.  Id. 
at 279.  Judge Sloviter maintained that in trademark infringement 
cases, contrary to Securacom New Jersey’s contention, exceptional 
circumstances can be found even if a defendant is not found to have 
willfully infringed a plaintiff’s mark.  Id.  The judge noted that the 
purpose for the earlier remand, after the appellate court’s finding 
that willful infringement was lacking, was to determine whether 
attorney’s fees were warranted by other circumstances.  Id.  The 
court next opined that the legislative history of the Lanham Act and 
judicial precedent do not limit exceptional circumstances to 
instances of willful infringement, but rather include all culpable 
conduct by a losing party during the litigation, including acts of bad 
faith, malice, or fraud.  Id. at 279-80. 
Continuing, Judge Sloviter pointed out that an award of 
attorney’s fees is available to both plaintiffs and defendants in 
trademark infringement cases, and not just against the party that 
willfully infringed.  Id. at 280.  The judge explained that if a 
defendant were to prevail at trial, the plaintiff’s conduct during 
litigation could provide justification for a finding of exceptional 
circumstances and a subsequent award of attorney’s fees.  Id. 
The court then noted that the Lanham Act’s legislative history 
required an examination of equitable considerations in each case 
when assessing an award of attorney’s fees.  Id. at 280-81.  Although 
the legislative history detailed that such an award was deemed 
necessary to make a trademark holder’s remedy complete, Judge 
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Sloviter explained that limiting the basis for attorney’s fees to a 
defendant’s actions only during infringement would contravene the 
equitable requirement of the statute to assess the circumstances as a 
whole.  Id. at 281.  The judge maintained that willful infringement 
by a defendant is but one factor to consider in determining whether 
a finding of exceptional circumstances is warranted, and is not 
exclusive of all others.  Id. 
Judge Sloviter next observed that the Patent Act contains a fee 
provision identical to that in the Lanham Act, and that Congress 
referred to the patent statute when adding the fee provision to the 
Lanham Act.  Id.  The court maintained that the Patent Act does not 
require willful infringement for an award of attorney’s fees, and 
moreover, under the Act, the use of vexatious litigation tactics has 
been found to justify an award of attorney’s fees.  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, the court held that “culpable conduct other 
than willful infringement” can create an exceptional case for 
purposes of the fee provision of the Lanham Act.  Id. at 282. 
Finally, Judge Sloviter determined that the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey had not abused its discretion in awarding 
attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act even though the district court 
had denied such an award on SecuraComm Pennsylvania motion 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.  Id. at 282.  The court 
maintained that the failure to pursue other available statutory 
methods of obtaining attorney’s fees is not a bar to a finding of 
exceptional circumstances and an award of attorney’s fees under the 
Lanham Act.  Id.  Further, Judge Sloviter asserted that the grant of 
attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act was based on the culpable 
conduct that Securacom New Jersey displayed throughout the entire 
case, not merely its conduct during the discovery process.  Id.  As a 
result, the judge found no inconsistency on the part of the district 
court in the award of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act but not 
under Rule 11.  Id.  The court concluded that the award of attorney’s 
fees was warranted based on Securacom New Jersey’s attempt to 
financially cripple its opponent through the use of oppressive 
litigation tactics.  Id. at 283. 
In affirming the district court, the Third Circuit has sent a clear 
message to litigants engaged in protracted litigation under the 
Lanham Act.  By dispensing with what appears to be delaying 
tactics in a long and aggressive case, the court has indicated that 
recourse to vexatious conduct may not only be tactically 
unsuccessful, but may also subject litigants to financial penalties.  
Moreover, by announcing the broad standard of “culpable conduct 
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other than willful infringement” as grounds for the finding of 
exceptional circumstances, the court gives notice to parties that 
behavior not related to the use of the mark at issue is subject to 
scrutiny for purposes of the fee provision.  Finally, in holding that 
vexatious litigation tactics alone may constitute an such “culpable 
conduct” sufficient to justify an award of fees under the Act, the 
court has clarified the circumstances under which a mark owner 
may be subject to the fee provision.  This decision will hopefully 
result in a greater degree of civility in such litigation, and serve as a 
deterrent to unnecessary and wasteful delaying tactics by both 
owners of marks and alleged infringers. 
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